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Chapter Eleven 
 
A Feminist Human Rights Perspective on the Use of Internal Relocation by Asylum 
Adjudicators 
 
Nora Honkala 
 
My first encounter with Professor Sandy Ghandhi was as a master’s student in his module on 
international human rights. Indeed, it was his module.  This is not just a cliché but also one 
that is demonstrative of his relentless belief in human rights being the idea of our time.  
Sandy taught the module inspirationally, seamlessly pulling together the immensity of theory 
and practice concerning the field, making it not only educational but also thoroughly 
enjoyable.  Sandy’s exceptional experience, intellectual rigour and capacity for hard work are 
often modestly hidden behind his casual charm and wit.  As my doctoral supervisor and 
mentor, Sandy never waned in his enthusiasm for engaging with justice, finding words of 
encouragement during my moments of despair; and, most of all, for giving me the space to 
make up my own mind.  I am fortunate to have begun my academic career under Sandy’s 
mentorship. 
I.). Introduction 
Women’s refugee claims often concern complex human rights violations that necessitate a 
nuanced interpretation and application of refugee law.  The United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees (UNHCR) offers guidance to adjudicators to take a liberal and humanitarian 
spirit in light of the object and purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention.  In this chapter, I 
examine the jurisprudence from two appellate level decisions: FB (Lone Women-PSG-
internal relocation-AA (Uganda) considered) Sierra Leone [2008] UKAIT 00090
1
 and HC & 
RC (Trafficked Women) China CG [2009] UKAIT 00027.
2
 In both cases the adjudicators 
                                                        
1
 Hereinafter FB (Sierra Leone). 
2
 Hereinafter HC & RC (China). 
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found there to be ‘persecution’ within the meaning of the Refugee Convention, but dismissed 
the appeals based on the availability of an internal relocation option.  
In this chapter I seek to critique the adjudicators’ reasoning with regard to the internal 
relocation option and argue that this reasoning evidences a problematically restrictive 
application of refugee law and process.  Evidence from the two cases reveals that the 
reasoning does not adequately take into account the socio-legal realities of the nature of the 
asylum seeker women’s human rights violations.  As such, the chapter concludes that the 
interpretation of the law evident in these decisions falls short of the standard of taking into 
account the overall object and purpose of the Convention, as well as the general human rights 
context.  What is proposed is to engage with the feminist critiques in order to understand the 
discrimination that such an approach can cause. 
II.) International Refugee Law Framework  
The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1968 Protocol form the 
foundations of the international refugee protection regime.  Today, the Convention has 145 
State party signatories and remains the sole international legally binding instrument that gives 
protection to refugees.  The definition of a refugee contained in the Convention is one of the 
most widely-accepted international norms, and one that has also made its way into public 
consciousness.
3
  Even though the Refugee Convention and its Protocol do not require the 
definition to be adopted by States, many nonetheless employ it in their domestic asylum 
systems.
4
  The Convention defines a refugee as a person who 
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
                                                        
3
 Daniel J. Steinbock, “The Refugee Definition as Law: Issues of Interpretation,” in Refugee Rights and 
Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes, edited by Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 13-36, at 13. 
4
 James C. Hathaway, “A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premises of Refugee Law” Harvard International 
Law Journal 31 (1990): 129. 
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avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
5
 
When a State makes a refugee status determination, the asylum seeker must prove that she 
has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of one or more of the enumerated 
Convention Grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.  Persecution must be shown.  A commonly accepted method is to show this 
by finding both “serious harm” and the “failure of State protection”.6  It is important to 
remember that the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention are humanitarian.  As stated 
in its preamble, the goal of the Convention is to “assure refugees the widest possible exercise 
of these fundamental rights and freedoms…without discrimination”. 
The particular ways in which international refugee law is applied can have significant 
gendered consequences for the claims of many women.  Although women can of course 
suffer from the same kinds of persecution as men, there is evidence that women have been 
unable to benefit equally from the protection afforded by the Refugee Convention.
7
  
Women’s claims thus necessitate an understanding of the particular implications of gender in 
relation to their claims.  There can be said to be two main ways in which women may not be 
afforded equal treatment under the Refugee Convention: first, that the usual interpretation of 
the Convention marginalises women’s experiences and, secondly, that procedural and 
evidential barriers can decrease the quality of the decision-making process.
8
  This chapter is 
concerned with the first of these obstacles.
9
 
                                                        
5
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, art. 1 A (2). 
6
 Hathaway, supra note 4, at 129. 
7
 Heaven Crawley, Refugees and Gender: Law and Process (Bristol: Jordans, 2011): 5. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 For thorough investigation into quality of initial decision-making in the UK, including the procedural barriers, 
see Helene Muggeridge and Chen Maman, “Unsustainable: The Quality of Initial Decision-Making in Women’s 
Asylum Claims,” Asylum Aid, January 2011, http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/unsustainableweb.pdf. 
4 
 
III.) Feminist Engagement with International Refugee Law 
The problems with the interpretation of the Refugee Convention stem from the fact that the 
Convention remains deeply rooted in its history.  At the time of the drafting of the 
Convention, the relevance of gender was only discussed once.
10
  The Yugoslav delegate 
proposed that the category “sex” be included in Article 3, which states that the Convention 
shall be applied “without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin”.11  However, 
this suggestion was rejected as the feeling at the time was that “the equality of the sexes was 
a matter for national legislation”.12  The Chairman of the drafting committee, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees Van Heuven Goedhart, strongly doubted whether there would 
ever be any cases on account of sex.
13
  Refugee women thus remained mostly invisible until 
the 1980s. 
It was largely due to NGOs, feminist activists and academics that this invisibility of 
women asylum seekers was exposed and brought onto the international agenda.  Feminists 
have indeed been criticising the supposed gender neutrality of the refugee definition since the 
1980s.
14
  The ways in which the Refugee Convention has been interpreted, particularly in 
Western industrialised States, have been heavily influenced by the historical context of the 
Convention itself. The model of the Convention’s refugee definition is a sole, male, political 
exile, who was considered to be the main casualty of the Cold War era.
15
 
Many women’s claims do not fit this model and the fact that gender is not included as 
a Convention ground has been controversial.  Feminists like Jane Freedman have argued that 
the absence of gender as a sixth category has meant that gender-related persecution has been 
                                                        
10
 Thomas Spijkerboer, Gender and Refugee Status (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000): 1. 
11
 Spijkerboer, supra note 10, at 1. 
12
 Ibid., quoting the British delegate. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 For example, Doreen Indra, “Gender: A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experience,” Refuge 6, 3 (1987); and 
Jacqueline Greatbatch, “The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse,” International 
Journal of Refugee Law 1 (1989): 517. 
15
 Jacqueline Bhabha and Sue Shutter, Women’s Movement: Women under Immigration, Nationality and 
Refugee Law (London: Trentham Books, 1994). 
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trivialised, and demonstrates that it has not been taken as seriously as other forms of 
persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality or political opinion.
16
  On the other 
hand, it has also been argued that a separate category might lead all persecution done to 
women being “pigeon-holed”, leading to perceptions that women’s persecution is always 
something fundamentally different from that of men, and – by inference – something less 
important.
17
  It is generally accepted, however, that the international climate is not conducive 
to the expansion of the refugee definition by way of including gender as a sixth category.
18
  It 
is therefore imperative that the refugee convention is interpreted in a manner that is inclusive 
and gender sensitive.  Bhabha, Crawley and Goldberg have all argued for a more inclusive 
approach to defining what constitutes persecution.
19
  The problem then is not the Convention 
definition but the way in which women’s experiences are actually “represented and 
analytically characterised”.20  The cases of FB (Sierra Leone) and HC & RC (China) both 
show how the adjudicators use restrictive interpretation of the internal relocation principle 
and ignore the socio-legal realities of the women’s experiences. 
IV.) Gender and Internal Relocation Option 
“A loved child has many names”.21 
The terms internal relocation, internal protection, internal flight alternative, internal flight 
option, and internal relocation option all refer to a State created legal concept that in the 
1980s quickly rose to become a stable hurdle in the refugee determination process.  Albeit 
                                                        
16
 Jane Freedman, Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007): 75. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Emily Copeland, “A Rare Opening in the Wall: The Growing Recognition of Gender-Based Persecution,” in 
Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees and Human Rights in the 21
st
 Century, edited by Niklaus 
Steiner et al. (London: Routledge, 2003): 101-116, 101. 
19
 Jacqueline Bhabha, “Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 (2002): 
155; Heaven Crawley, “Engendering the State in Refugee Women’s Claims for Asylum,” in States of Conflict: 
Gender Violence and Resistance, edited by Susie M. Jacobs et al. (New York: Zed Books, 2000); Crawley, 
supra note 5; and Pamela Goldberg, “Anyplace but Home: Asylum in the United States for Women Fleeing 
Intimate Violence,” Cornell International Law Journal 26 (1993): 565. 
20
 Heaven Crawley, “Gender, Persecution and the Concept of Politics in the Asylum Determination Process,” 
Forced Migration Review 9 (2000): 17, 19. 
21
 Scandinavian proverb. 
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through varied tests, States around the world have embraced the internal relocation option as 
a mechanism to deny and restrict international protection to asylum seekers.  Given that 
women’s asylum claims are more likely than men’s to involve non-State agent persecution, 
women are disproportionally affected by the application of this option. 
While the origins of the internal relocation option are not clear, what is often referenced 
is the UNHCR Handbook.  The UNHCR in 1979 provided the following instructions: 
The fear of being persecuted need not always extend to the whole territory of the 
refugee’s country of nationality.  Thus in ethnic clashes or in cases of grave 
disturbances involving civil war conditions, persecution of a specific ethnic or 
national group may occur in only one part of the country.  In such situations, a 
person will not be excluded from refugee status merely because he could not have 
sought refuge in another part of the same country, if under all the circumstances it 
would not have been reasonable to expect him to do so.
22
 
It is evident from the instruction that it was meant to deter States from excluding persons 
from refugee status merely because they could have sought internal protection elsewhere 
within the country.
23
  However, since the 1980s States have used this instruction very 
restrictively, if not in bad faith. States have interpreted the instruction to mean that exclusion 
from refugee status may be justified and that the inquiry could include a retrospective 
analysis (i.e., whether the asylum seeker could have sought refuge in another part of the same 
country).
24
  The UNHCR has subsequently issued further instructions to States in the 
application of a two-stage test, first on the “relevance analysis” and then on the 
                                                        
22
 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, reedited January1992, UNHCR, 1979, U.N. Doc. 
HCR/IP/Eng/REV.1, ¶ 91, emphasis added. 
23
 James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, “Chapter 6.1: Internal Protection/Relocation/Flight Alternative as an 
Aspect of Refugee Status Determination,” in Refugee Protection in International Law; UNHCR’s Global 
Consultations on International Protection, edited by Erika Feller et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003): 357- 417, 361.  
24
 Ibid., 362. 
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“reasonableness analysis”.25  But as much as the UNHCR has since wanted to clarify the 
appropriate application of the internal relocation option, the instruction has taken on a life of 
its own, its dire consequences proving too difficult to rein in. 
While the internal relocation option was not envisioned at the time of the drafting of 
the Refugee Convention, or indeed until around the 1980s when state policies regarding 
asylum were significantly more open, authorities in the field argue that the internal relocation 
option is consistent with international refugee law.
26
  This is because, as Hathaway explains, 
“international protection is designed to provide a back-up source of protection” or surrogate 
protection to persons seriously at risk.
27
  A refugee claims this international surrogate 
protection because her own state cannot or will not provide protection.
28
  A refugee can rely 
on this surrogate protection when she has shown that there is a lack of State protection.  With 
the task of harmonising European Union policy on asylum, internal relocation has now also 
become codified in EU law, in Article 8 of the Recast Qualification Directive.
29
  The EU 
approach to what it terms the “internal protection alternative” has been criticised as not 
conforming to international law.
30
 
The development of the doctrine in the UK has taken influences from both 
international jurisprudence and EU law.  In the UK, internal relocation option developed 
                                                        
25
 UNHCR, Position Paper on Relocating Internally as a Reasonable Alternative to Seeking Asylum (The So-
Called “Internal Flight Alternative” or “Relocation Principle”), 9 February 
1999, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b336c.html, ¶¶ 13-14 and 15-17 respectively. 
26
 James C. Hathaway, “International Refugee Law: The Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection 
Alternative,” Michigan Journal of International Law 21 (1999): 131. 
27
 Hathaway and Foster, supra note 23, 358. 
28
 Dallal Stevens, UK Asylum Law and Policy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2004): 328. 
29
Recast Qualification Directive 2011/95/EV, 13 December 2011, http://www.ilga-
europe.org/home/issues/asylum_in_europe/monitoring_eu_asylum_law/the_recast_qualification_directive_2011
_95_eu, 9. 
30
 Hathaway and Foster, supra note 23.  For a comprehensive analysis of the Recast Qualification Directive and 
its critique, see John Eaton, “The Internal Protection Alternative under European Union Law: Examining the 
Recast Qualification Directive,” International Journal of Refugee Law 24, 4 (2012): 765. 
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through three main cases: Karanakaran,
31
 Robinson
32
 and Januzi.
33
  In Karanakaran, Sedley 
LJ explained that: 
 […] in most cases, […], it is in relation to the asylum seeker’s ability or willingness 
to avail himself of his home State’s protection that the question of internal relocation 
arises.  Because, however, unwillingness is explicitly related to the driving fear, it 
predicates a different set of considerations from inability, which may be indicated or 
contraindicated by a much wider range of factors.
34
 
In Robinson,
35
 the Court of Appeal looked towards international jurisprudence in addressing 
the specific question of reasonableness of relocation.  The Court was informed by the 
Canadian case of Thirunavukkarasu, where the question of whether it “would be unduly 
harsh to expect this person to move to another less hostile part of the country” was 
considered to be part of the test to measure the “reasonableness” of the internal relocation 
option.
36
  Woolf LJ also enumerated various tests that had previously been applied within the 
UK context.
37
  Of note for present purposes was the last of these: “if the quality of the 
internal protection fails to meet basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic human 
rights”, relocation was considered to be unavailable.38  This part of the test suits a position 
that Hathaway and Foster have argued for, that consideration should be firmly placed on 
international human rights law standards. 
                                                        
31
 Karanakaran v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 11. 
32
 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department & Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Robinson [1997] 
EWCA Civ 3090. 
33
 Januzi (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5. 
34
 Ibid., LJ Stedley ¶ 4.  
35
 Robinson, supra note 32. 
36
 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 FC 589 (CA). 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3deb87324.html. 
37
 Robinson, supra note 32, ¶ 18: “For example, (a) if as a practical matter (whether for financial, logistical or 
other good reason) the ‘safe’ part of the country is not reasonably accessible; (b) if the claimant is required to 
encounter great physical danger in travelling there or staying there; (c) if he or she is required to undergo undue 
hardship in travelling there or staying there; (d) if the quality of the internal protection fails to meet basic norms 
of civil, political and socio-economic human rights.” . 
38
 Ibid. 
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Hathaway and Foster argue for a shift towards an “internal protection alternative” and 
reject the current UNHCR recommendation to analyse whether it is “reasonable” to require 
the claimant to avail herself of the “safety” of the proposed internal destination in favour of a 
commitment to assess the sufficiency of protection that is accessible to the asylum seeker 
there.
39
  Their analysis has been accepted by international refugee lawyers and has been 
coined the “Michigan approach” following an international round table organised there.40  
The reasonableness test is notoriously difficult to apply, lending itself to highly 
subjective interpretations.  Hathaway has criticised it as being “prone to arbitrariness…[and] 
involving an unfocused and open-ended inquiry which is not anchored in the language or 
object” of the Refugee Convention.41  However, it is the Michigan approach, informed by 
international refugee law and international human rights law, which the House of Lords 
rejected outright in Januzi.  The House of Lords explicitly held that reasonableness of 
internal relocation should not be evaluated on the basis of the place of relocation meeting 
civil, political and socioeconomic rights.
42
  According to Lord Bingham, neither the Refugee 
Convention nor the Qualification Directive’s Article 8 requires a human rights approach as 
advanced by the Michigan Guidelines.
43
  However, Lord Bingham was of the opinion that 
decisions should be guided by the UNHCR Guidelines, which do address “respect for human 
rights” and “economic survival”.44  In essence, then, Lord Bingham advances a position that 
– instead of the Michigan approach’s non-discrimination principle – adjudicators should ask 
the question: can the claimant live a “relatively normal life”?45  
                                                        
39
 Hathaway and Foster, supra note 22, 381. 
40
 Hathaway, supra note 26. 
41
 Hathaway and Foster, supra note 22, 387. 
42
 Eaton, supra note 30, 778. 
43
 Januzi, supra note 33, ¶¶ 15-20. 
44
 UNHCR, Guidelines on Internal Protection: “Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative” within the Context of 
Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 23 July 2003, 
U.N. Doc. HRC/GIP/03/04, ¶¶ 28-30. 
45
 Eaton, supra note 30, 778. 
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Lord Bingham’s analysis illustrates some of the difficulties in advancing a human 
rights approach in the UK context.  Reasonableness analysis, of course, forms one of the 
foundational principles within common law traditions.  However, it is arguable that 
grounding the application of the internal relocation test to international human rights 
standards is more desirable, particularly in the case of women asylum seekers where gender-
based persecution is part of their claim.  This is because human rights, if appropriately used, 
could provide a useful standard of measurement that is internationally recognised. In 
particular, advances made in the area of women’s rights could better inform decisions made 
on asylum-seeker women’s claims.  Arguably, it provides a less subjective test than the 
manner in which the reasonableness test has so far been applied, which has discriminated 
against women.  
Undoubtedly, however, a human rights approach does not offer a panacea in refugee 
determination processes.  There is always the additional problem of trying to make individual 
caseworkers in the first instance, and later adjudicators and appellate tribunal members, 
actually apply a certain approach.  Even when higher courts have created additional criteria 
for the application of the internal relocation option, they have not been able to control how 
the criteria are ultimately applied by the decision-maker.
46
  Indeed, the Upper Tribunal has, 
as evidenced from the following cases, been extremely restrictive in its application of the 
internal relocation option. 
What is argued here is that an alternative reading is not only possible, but also needed 
when considering the specific cases where the internal relocation option has been used to 
deny refugee status for women fleeing gender-based persecution.  The Tribunal has used its 
internal relocation option tests so restrictively that it places an unnecessarily high standard for 
the asylum-seeker women to pass.  The reasonableness analysis has been particularly 
                                                        
46
 Stevens, supra note 28, 329. 
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susceptible to the Tribunal’s problematic views on the dichotomy of victimhood and agency 
that stem from their Eurocentric and male-centred perspective.  It is finally suggested that an 
assessment of the relocation option, if impossible to challenge per se, should be grounded in 
international human rights standards.  If applied with gender sensitivity, it could improve the 
current state of the internal relocation option test. 
V.) HC & RC (China) and Internal Relocation  
HC & RC (China) is a case involving a trafficked woman and her child from a rape.  HC was 
born in the village of Nan Shan in Henei City in Anhui province in China, where she was 
looked after by her grandmother between the ages of 6, when she was orphaned, and 10, 
when her grandmother died.  After her grandmother’s death, HC left her home village and 
ended up in Sezhuan where she lived on the streets, scavenging for food and sometimes 
finding work.  After moving to and working in a rural area as a domestic worker, she moved 
back to the city. For a few years, she moved around like this in search of work. 
It was in 2005, at the age of 14 or 15, that she became involved in prostitution.  She 
was employed washing dishes when she met a middle-aged woman who promised her well-
paid work. She did not know what the work involved.  She went on a journey by minibus 
with this woman and two other young girls and arrived at a house.  After a few days she was 
told she had to take clients, she was being forced into prostitution.  She saved money to 
facilitate an escape.  She used this money to pay an agent believing that he would help her 
escape. However, this agent took her to Russia and forced her into prostitution.  After getting 
pregnant, she was told to leave and she fled to the UK. 
The case of HC & RC (China) evidences some of the problematic reasoning found in 
women’s cases when adjudicators judge the “reasonableness” of the internal relocation option 
from a particular individualistic, Western male perspective.  The adjudicators are able to 
come to the conclusion that the internal relocation option is possible for HC & RC by a 
12 
 
limited engagement with the risk of re-trafficking and lack of State protection and by viewing 
the “reasonableness” of the internal relocation option from a narrow perspective that fails to 
engage meaningfully with the realities of the violations of the applicant’s socio-economic 
rights. 
In HC & RC (China), the adjudicators narrate HC’s experiences through a simplistic 
vision of agency, or lack thereof, and evidence a failure to understand the nature of 
trafficking.  This narrative has little to do with the economic realities, global inequalities, 
disfranchisement and the ever increasing strictness with which State borders are policed, that 
make up the major forces behind global trafficking of women.  The portrayal of the 
traditional trafficking victim is echoed in the current international approaches to trafficking.  
The larger story of the evolving legal framework on trafficking has been problematic.  As 
argued elsewhere, the official presentation follows the cinematic representation of trafficking 
as highly gendered and reproduces stereotypical narratives of femininity and masculinity.
47
  It 
is these larger narratives of victimization and criminalization that mask the very real global 
structural inequalities that produce the conditions for trafficking. 
Notably, it is this stereotypical ideal of the “proper” victim that elicits the protection 
approach of the Western legal machinery.  It is also the way in which HC’s story is told, 
through the simplistic binary of victimhood and agency.  She is represented as young and 
“naïve” as she recounts her lack of awareness that she would be forced into prostitution.  The 
Home Office Presenting Officer (HOPO) argued that “when she [HC] was younger and more 
vulnerable she had not been abducted.  She had ended up as a prostitute through naivety”.48  
The implication seems to be that if she had been abducted, she would conform to the 
stereotypical image of trafficking victim, completely void of agency.  HC, on the other hand, 
                                                        
47
 Rutvica Andrijasevic, “Chapter 11: The Difference Borders Make: (Il)legality, Migration and Trafficking in 
Italy among Eastern European Women in Prostitution,” in Uprootings/Regroundings: Questions of Home and 
Migration, Sara Ahmed et al. (Oxford: Berg, 2003): 251- 271, at 265. 
48
 HC & RC (China), ¶ 36. 
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was just young and naïve.  Although she might elicit some sympathy as an innocent victim at 
that stage, now, after coming to the UK and “growing up” HC, according to the HOPO, does 
not fit this mould anymore.  Now, “she is aware of the position, if it were to arise again”.49  
According to the HOPO narrative, she now has agency, she now knows, and she would not 
consent to being trafficked again.  Eventually, it is the adoption of this reductive narrative 
based on the binary dichotomy of victimhood and agency that allows the Tribunal to reach 
the conclusion that she is not at risk of re-trafficking and that internal relocation option is 
available to her.  The representation of HC’s experiences is thoroughly divorced from the 
economic, political and social realities that are central to her claim. 
It is this kind of reasoning that shows that the adjudicators are assessing the viability 
of internal relocation from a particularized individualistic and economically privileged 
Western position.  It is as if the issue is as simple as, for example, moving house from Belfast 
to London might be for them as privileged, white males.  This reasoning ignores the 
multitude of factors that affect practical access to protection elsewhere in the country of 
origin. In reality, women face multiple issues including financial, social, linguistic, familial 
and logistical that affect their ability/inability to relocate to another part of the country of 
their origin.  It is not sufficient for the adjudicators to think that the persecution can be 
localized; the question needs to be a holistic assessment of whether there is any realistic 
likelihood of access to protection of their rights. 
Equally, in finding that HC & RC would not become destitute on return to China, the 
adjudicators use very problematic reasoning.  They seem to either not want or be capable of 
estimating the realities of a single mother in China.  They mention that “Beijing is a city 
where single mothers clubs have been established”.50  Yet they did not reflect on whether HC 
could actually access these clubs.  There is no consideration on who has access to these clubs 
                                                        
49
 Ibid., ¶ 36. 
50
 Ibid., ¶ 91. 
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or what their costs are.  The existence of support to some people is not enough if it is not 
meaningfully accessible to the person in question.  The adjudicators think that she can get 
domestic or agricultural work, but again do not consider how she will be able to get work and 
take care of her child at the same time as a single mother with no relatives in the country nor 
any economic resources of her own. 
The adjudicators also brush aside the expert evidence that provides that she and her 
child are at a high risk of re-trafficking.  The evidence from human rights NGOs is also 
ignored, even when they specifically addressed the lack of substantive protection from 
trafficking and exploitation of women “due to limited legislative definitions, administrative 
detention of prostitutes and policy execution”.51  They even ignored a United States State 
Department Report, used to provide evidence for the lack of State protection, which stated 
that, despite the general anti-corruption measures, the PRC government “did not demonstrate 
concerted efforts to investigate and punish government officials specifically for complicity in 
trafficking”.52  Key deficiencies that the Report noted were in the area of victim care and 
protection and tackling trafficking for involuntary servitude or forced labour which, as the 
expert Dr Sheehan explained, were the precise areas upon which HC and RC would rely for 
protection against re-trafficking.
53
  The State Department Report further stated that protection 
and rehabilitation for trafficking victims was modest and that protection services remained 
“temporarily inadequate to address victim’s needs”.54 
The adjudicators are able to side-line the evidence of a lack of protection of the rights 
of victims of trafficking by coming to the conclusion that HC would just not consent to being 
re-trafficked.  The economic disadvantage and the possibilities of destitution are not 
addressed adequately as the adjudicators reason that she is in fact a “mere economic 
                                                        
51
 Ibid., ¶ 11. 
52
 Ibid., ¶ 15. 
53
 Ibid. 
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migrant”.  The adjudicators take the view that since the she is an orphan and has lived on the 
streets, she “had accumulated considerable experience of fending for herself”.55  This leads 
them to decide that she will be able to relocate and that, even if she might “encounter 
economic difficulties”, she will not “be permitted to sink into destitution”, as they claim that 
she will be able to get some assistance from the All-China Women’s Federation.56  After all, 
the Tribunal reasons:  
the humanitarian object of the Refugee Convention was to secure a reasonable 
measure of protection for those with a well-founded fear of persecution in their 
home country or some part of it; it was not to produce a general levelling-up of 
living standards around the world; desirable though of course that was.
57
 
The expert evidence on the “severe discrimination and considerable long-term social and 
economic disadvantages” is overridden in a particularly noteworthy manner.  The Tribunal 
considers a newspaper article consisting of an interview of six single mothers in China.  It 
states that “[i]t may very well be that she would encountere a degree of prejudice but, 
nonetheless, it is clear from the articles referring to the six single mothers mentioned above 
that, despite whatever prejudice they encountered, they were still pleased to have had their 
children, which demonstrates in our view that they had not encountered overwhelming 
prejudice”.58  It is not clear how the degree of a mother being pleased to have had her child 
demonstrates a correlation to the degree of societal prejudice.  It is probably the case that 
many parents would be pleased to have had their children, no matter what society might say 
of them. Basing decisions on such a newspaper article trivialises the actual societal prejudice 
and discrimination that women face. This is doubly problematic as the adjudicators in this 
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case also disregard the evidence from reputable human rights organisations as well as the 
country expert evidence. 
This is despite the concerns of the expert evidence that HC’s lack of family or social 
network and her poverty would make her a likely target for traffickers if returned to China.  
Dr Sheehan considered both “work and accommodation to be activities fraught with risk for a 
young woman alone”.59  Some people-traffickers would typically disguise their actions with 
offers of legitimate work and/or accommodation.  However cautious she might be, she would 
remain “extremely vulnerable to the many fake employment agencies and training providers 
in China, which were actually fronts for people-trafficking”.60  This is because the only 
relatively safe way to find work in China is to follow the recommendation of a family 
member or someone from the same home village or small town, an option which the 
appellant did not have: she would have no choice but to go to exactly the kind of agencies 
that traffickers exploited.
61
 
The UNHCR Guidelines on Relocation note that internal relocation consideration 
should be a holistic exercise where the decision-maker looks at the individual personal 
circumstances, including past persecution or the fear of it, psychological and health 
condition, family and social situation and survival capacities.
62
  In HC & RC (China), the 
adjudicators, while not referring to the Guidelines, discuss each point and arrive at a 
restrictive view that invites criticism of selective use of evidence and purposeful exclusion.  
For instance, when considering her lack of family at place of relocation, it is not considered 
in the meaningful way in which the expert evidence for instance provides, i.e., the 
discrimination and real difficulties faced by lone women without family networks.  Instead, 
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the adjudicators use her lack of family to argue that – since in their view the principal reason 
for discrimination against trafficked women is that their families had lost face – as the 
appellant has no family, “this principal cause of discrimination would not arise”.63  This 
finding completely ignores the realities of structural discrimination, and specifically 
discrimination that is based on gender. 
The adjudicators fail to recognise the real risk of violations of HC’s socio-economic 
rights upon her return.  The problem of not recognising systemic violations of economic and 
social rights, particularly in relation to women, is a reflection of a larger problem of 
international refugee law still seeming to consider civil and political rights violations as being 
of more importance.  It reflects the pervasiveness of the “traditional, single, male” refugee 
model.  By privileging violations of civil and political rights, decision-makers are at risk of 
discriminating against women asylum seekers, especially those persecuted by non-state 
actors.  Recognition of social and economic rights necessitates an understanding of the 
context, which arguably in the case of HC & RC (China) was repeatedly and decisively 
ignored.  Such restrictive reasoning goes against the object and purpose of the Refugee 
Convention, to apply the Convention expansively so as to afford people the widest possible 
exercise of their rights without discrimination. 
VI.) FB (Sierra Leone) and Internal Relocation Option 
There is an underlying reason why the internal relocation option assessment disproportionally 
affects women’s asylum cases. The reason is because women are more likely to have been 
persecuted by non-state actors. There is a presumption that if the persecution is by state 
actors, an assessment of internal relocation is not applicable.  This is the preferable 
presumption. In the case where non-state actors are the persecutors, the presumption that the 
internal relocation option is automatically applicable is problematic. Much of the persecution 
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of women is, indeed, by non-state actors due to the unequal social, economic and political 
situation of women in societies.  In such cases, the adjudicators need to make a decision on 
whether there is effective, accessible and practicable state protection or whether the state of 
origin is unable or unwilling to offer protection to the asylum seeker.  Too often, in women’s 
cases, the adjudicators are fixated with localising the asylum seeker women’s harm.  In these 
cases, the persecution by non-state actors is constructed as something solely private and 
therefore localised. 
FB was 16 years old from Sierra Leone when she arrived in the UK and claimed 
asylum.  She lived in Bankala village with her parents and brothers.  Her father had been 
killed in 1999 during the civil war.  The appellant’s mother was a sowei64 and one of the 
women who carried out the ritual circumcision of young girls.  When FB was about 16, she 
underwent female genital mutilation (FGM).  She spent about five days recovering in a 
nearby village during which time she was told that her mother had died and she was to 
replace her mother as a sowei.  On her return to her village she told of her reluctance to the 
local chief but he insisted that she go through the rituals to become a sowei, and that she 
would subsequently become one of his wives.  She refused this and fled. 
Initially, the Secretary of State refused her claim, as he did not accept that her 
contention that she would be forced into becoming a sowei and would be forced to marry the 
local chief engaged the Refugee Convention.  The Adjudicator rejected a risk of further FGM 
and thought it would not be unduly harsh for her to relocate.  She applied to the Immigration 
and Asylum Tribunal on the basis that the Adjudicator had made a series of legal errors.  The 
application was dismissed on the basis that she was not a member of a particular social group, 
but on renewal, a reconsideration was ordered.  Subsequently, her case turned on the finding 
of the availability of the internal relocation option. 
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In FB (Sierra Leone), situating the harm the claimant suffered in the private sphere is 
essential to the finding of the availability of the internal relocation option.  Amnesty reports 
cited as evidence showed how women’s civil, political, social and economic rights were 
being “violated on a daily basis” and that there was a “lack of formal protection” from the 
Sierra Leonean government.
65
  Indeed, the Tribunal accepted that she fell within one of the 
five enumerated Convention grounds of membership of a particular social group.
66
 
The problem for FB was that the adjudicators considered it “reasonable” for her to 
‘relocate’.  FB (Sierra Leone) is symptomatic of cases in which the UK approach to 
reasonableness of internal relocation has resulted in a consideration that is centred on the 
applicant rather than State actions (or omissions).  This means that the availability of the 
internal relocation option tends to be assessed based on the resources and opportunities 
available for the asylum seeker, rather than an examination of the actions of the State or its 
obligations.
67
  This has led to Tribunals finding that the internal relocation option is available 
even when there is no indication that such protection will come from the State.  For instance, 
in JM (Kenya) the adjudicators decided that the applicant could get protection from her 
“faith”. 68   Even though the adjudicators undoubtedly meant the church community, this 
mention of the metaphysical shows the absurdity with which the adjudicators decide cases 
when using the reasonableness test.  International refugee law, however, focuses on the State 
and its lack of protection.  There is nothing that justifies this reliance on other actors when 
the State is unwilling or unable to provide protection.  It is the State that has the primary 
obligation to provide protection and the claimant should not be expected to seek protection 
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from an entity that is not a legitimate or nominal government.
69
  There is a need to 
concentrate on State responsibility in order to avoid the restrictive and inappropriate use of 
the reasonableness test. 
Centring on the applicant, rather than the lack of state protection, coupled with 
simplistic binary framing of agency versus victimhood, makes it very difficult for asylum 
seeker women’s complex experiences to be intelligible to the Tribunal.  In FB (Sierra Leone), 
just as in HC & RC (China), the applicant’s display of her agency, and the Tribunal’s 
recognition of it, allowed the Tribunal arrive at the decision that she was thus able to relocate.  
The Tribunal in FB (Sierra Leone) stated: “whilst we would never wish to underestimate the 
vulnerability of young women in the position of the appellant, the appellant herself has 
shown both courage and resilience in facing her difficulties”.70 Furthermore, the adjudicators 
noted that they took “into account the particular skills that she had developed in the UK and 
the courage and resourcefulness she has displayed in coming here”. 71   The adjudicators 
appear to insinuate that since FB has managed to come to the UK, she is equally as able to 
relocate to another part of her country of origin.  With respect to the binary notions of 
victimhood and agency, there seems to be no successful position to take here.  Between these 
binary notions, the asylum seeker cannot be at the same time vulnerable and have agency. 
This complexity is not acknowledged by the decision-making process. 
The Tribunal considered that it would not be unduly harsh to relocate to Freetown 
“partly because it is a cosmopolitan urban environment where the rural chiefs do not have so 
great an influence and where state authority is more evident”.72  Again, the Tribunal did not 
take seriously the extensive evidence from Human Rights Watch and other country reports in 
the case, which demonstrated the lack of State protection for gender-based violence 
                                                        
69
 Ninette Kelley, “Internal Flight/Relocation/Protection Alternative: Is it Reasonable?,” International Journal 
of Refugee Law 14, 1 (2002): 4, at 24. 
70
 FB (Sierra Leone) ¶ 83. 
71
 Ibid., ¶ 87. 
72
 Ibid., ¶ 76. 
21 
 
throughout Sierra Leone.  FB had two children in the UK and is being sent back as a single 
mother with two children with neither family connections nor prospects of employment.  This 
is something which was considered in her evidence, but did not appear to make a difference 
to the final decision. 
As in HC & RC (China), the adjudicators are able to arrive at this decision by looking 
at the persecution narrowly.  By containing the non-state persecution within the private 
sphere, the adjudicators were able to speculate that FB could relocate to another part of Sierra 
Leone because the man she was being forced to marry was over 70 at the time and “might” 
be dead already.
73
  In these situations the complicity of the State is not analysed in any 
meaningful way.  The women in question are conceived as private subjects, constituted only 
through their relationship with these old men that “might” be dead already or, in the case of 
HC & RC (China), through HC’s relationship with the trafficker who would not find her 
anymore.  Conversely, these women are not subjects as themselves and in relation to their 
State, which is unable or unwilling to offer their rights protection.  This portrayal ultimately 
has the consequence of delegitimising these asylum seeker women’s cases.  While it fits 
government policy, it produces discriminatory outcomes. 
VII.) Conclusion  
In 2011, on the anniversary of the Refugee Convention, the Committee of the 
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted a 
statement that called for gender equality for refugees.  The CEDAW Committee 
call[ed] on States to recognize gender related forms of persecution and to interpret 
the ‘membership of a particular social group’74 ground of the 1951 Convention to 
apply to women. Gender sensitive registration, reception, interview and 
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adjudication processes also need to be in place to ensure women’s equal access to 
asylum.
75
  
The CEDAW Committee thus recognized that it is not only the interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention, but gender-sensitive adjudication processes, that are necessary for the protection 
of the rights of asylum seeker women. 
A human rights approach, in and of itself, is undoubtedly not free from difficulties of 
application, as can be seen in the case of the “reasonableness test” in internal relocation 
assessments.  However, when it comes to women’s rights, a human rights approach that takes 
into account the feminist critiques is preferable.  The discriminatory effects of the current 
assessment of the internal relocation option in women’s refugee status determination process 
must be challenged.  The concerns of the disproportionate effect on women of the 
hierarchisation of human rights and the public/private divide that enables greater impunity of 
women’s harm needs to be taken seriously.  By doing this we can hope to contribute to 
conversations that expose the ways in which the application of the internal relocation option 
has provided another means by which to restrict the movement of people. 
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